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LAPSED PROSPECTING RIGHTS: ‘THE CUSTODIAN GIVETH 
AND THE CUSTODIAN TAKETH AWAY’? PALALA RESOURCES
(PTY) LTD v MINISTER OF MINERAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY
P J BADENHORST
Associate Professor of Law, Deakin University; Visiting Professor of Law, Nelson
Mandela Metropolitan University
‘You want me on that wall, you need me on that wall!’
Colonel Jessup from the movie A Few Good Men (1992)
INTRODUCTION
The decision in Palala Resources (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and
Energy & others 2014 (6) SA 403 (GP) (‘Palala Resources’) brings clarity about
the lapsing of a company’s prospecting right in terms of s 56(c) of the Mineral
NOTES 37
and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (‘the MPRDA’)
upon deregistration of the company, and highlights some of the features of a
statutory prospecting right. Section 56(c) determines that a company’s
prospecting right will lapse upon deregistration of the company if no prior
application has been made, in terms of s 11(1) of the MPRDA, to the
Director-General of the Department of Mineral Resources for consent to
alienate or transfer the right (item 1 of the Ministerial delegation of 12 May
2004). The principles underlying the decision could also be applied to
mining rights granted in terms of the MPRDA. By way of introduction,
these rights are briefly sketched before the decision will be set out and
discussed. It will be argued that the case shows that despite the public law
nature of the MPRDA, there is the need for a proper private-law analysis of
these statutory rights.
The MPRDA has created statutory rights, such as prospecting rights and
mining rights, to enable applicants to exploit minerals. An application for the
grant of such rights has to take place in the prescribed manner at the office of
the Regional Manager of the Department (in whose region the land is
situated) (ss 16(1) and 22(1) of the MPRDA, respectively). The Regional
Manager will accept an application if the formal requirements for an
application have been met and no one else is holding rights to the same
mineral and land (ss 16(2) and 22(2)). Prospecting rights are granted by the
Regional Manager (item 5 of the Ministerial delegation) upon compliance
with the statutory requirements (see s 17(1)). Mining rights are granted by
the Minister of Mineral Resources upon compliance with the statutory
requirements (see s 23(1)). Both rights are registrable in the Mineral and
Petroleum Titles Registration Office (‘MPTRO’) (s 5(1)(d) of the Mining
Titles Registration Act 16 of 1967) and must be lodged for registration in the
MPTRO (ss 19(2)(a) and 25(2)(a) of the MPRDA, respectively). A limited
real right ‘in respect of the minerals and land’ is said to be created upon the
grant and registration of these rights in the MPTRO (s 5(1)).
A prospecting right entitles its holder (the ‘prospector’) to: (a) conduct
prospecting operations on the land; (b) remove and dispose of minerals for
purposes of testing, identification and analyses; (c) remove and dispose of
bulk samples of minerals subject to the necessary permission being first
obtained (s 5(3); P J Badenhorst & Hanri Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of
South Africa (2004) (Revision Service 9) at 13-20E); see further, s 20(1) of the
MPRDA); and (d) alienate and transfer the prospecting right to a third party.
A prospecting right is only alienable or transferable with the written
permission of the Director-General (s 11(1); item 1 of the Ministerial
delegation; see further P J Badenhorst & J J du Plessis ‘Alienation or disposal
of a ‘‘controlling interest’’ in a prospecting company — Mogale Alloys (Pty)
Ltd v Nuco Chrome Boputhatswana (Pty) Ltd 2011 (6) SA 96 (GSJ)’ 2012 De Jure
388). A prospector has the exclusive right to apply for: (a) a retention permit
to suspend prospecting operations during unfavourable market conditions
(s 31(1)); (b) a renewal of a prospecting right to continue with uncompleted
prospecting (s 19(1)(a)); and (c) a mining right to mine minerals in respect of
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the prospecting area (s 19(1)(b); Agri SA v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2012
(1) SA 171 (GNP) para 45; Badenhorst & Mostert op cit at 12-20E). The
prospecting right is thus linked with these other rights mentioned, which
linkage ensures security of tenure of rights from prospecting until and during
mining of the minerals (see further P J Badenhorst ‘Security of mineral tenure
in South Africa: Carrot or stick?’ (2014) 32 Journal of Energy & Natural
Resources Law 14 at 20). Upon proper application at the office of the Regional
Manager for the renewal (see s 18(1)) and compliance with the requirements
thereof (see s 18(2) and (3)), a prospecting right is renewed by the Regional
Manager (s 18(3); item 7 of the Ministerial delegation). A prospecting right is
valid for a specified period, which period may not exceed five years (s 17(6)),
or until the application for the renewal of the prospecting right has been
granted or refused by the Regional Manager (s 18(5)). A prospecting right is
subject to specific statutory duties (see s 19(2)(b)–(g)).
A mining right entitles its holder (hereafter ‘miner’) to: (a) conduct
prospecting operations; (b) conduct mining operations for minerals (s 5(3));
(c) apply for a renewal of the mining right to continue with mining
operations (s 25(1); Agri SA v Minister of Minerals and Energy (GNP) (supra)
para 47); and (d) to alienate and transfer the mining right subject to
permission in terms of s 11 of the MPRDA being obtained. An application
for the renewal of a mining right must be sought in terms of s 24 of the
MPRDA. A mining right is valid for a specified period, which may not
exceed 30 years (s 23(6)) or until the application for the renewal of the
mining right has been granted or refused by the Minister (s 24(5)). A mining
right is subject to specific statutory duties (see s 25(2)(b)–(h)).
The abovementioned acts of the officials of the Department are adminis-
trative decisions. The MPRDA provides for an internal appeal against an
administrative decision of the Regional Manager to the Director-General,
and, an appeal to the Minister against the administrative decision of the
Director-General (s 96(1)). These decisions are subject to review by the
courts once the departmental appeal has been completed (s 96(3)).
A prospecting right or mining right is terminated upon expiry of the
period for which it was granted (s 56(a)), after cancellation by the Minister
upon specified grounds (s 56(e); see s 47(1)), or upon the happening of
specified legal events. These events are: (a) death of the prospector or miner
in the absence of a successor in title (s 56(b)); (b) deregistration of a company
which held the right in the absence of Ministerial consent to transfer the right
to a successor in title (s 56(c)); (c) liquidation or sequestration of the
prospector or miner (s 56(d)); and (d) abandonment of the right by the
prospector or miner (s 56(f)). Thus, these events involve loss or restriction of
the legal personality of the holder of prospecting or mining rights or loss of
the right itself by abandonment.
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FACTS
For the purposes of the discussion the facts can be summarised as follows.
The applicant, Palala Resources (Pty) Ltd (‘Palala’), was the holder of a
prospecting right granted under the MPRDA (para 6). The prospecting right
for gold and pyrite (LP 1488) was granted on 20 May 2009 for two years in
respect of a portion of the farm Malamulele 234 LT, Limpopo (‘the
property’) (para 10). The Registrar of Companies deregistered Palala on
10 July 2010 because of its failure to lodge its annual returns for a period of
more than six months (para 9). At the time of deregistration Palala was still
the ‘holder of the prospecting right’ in respect of the property (para 10).
Palala successfully applied to the Registrar of Companies for the restoration
of its registration under s 73(6A) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, with
effect from 13 September 2010 (para 11). During the time of deregistration
of Palala, another company, Hectocorp (Pty) Ltd (the third respondent),
applied for a prospecting right to gold in respect of the property, which was
accepted by the Regional Manager, Limpopo Region (para 12). Palala
objected to the Regional Manager’s acceptance of the application and
applied for renewal of its prospecting right (LP 1488), which application was
not accepted by the Regional Manager (paras 13–17). Palala appealed to the
Acting Director-General against the Regional Manager’s decision not to
accept its application for renewal of its prospecting right (para 18). The
Acting Director-General overturned the Regional Manager’s decision due
to lack of proof that Palala was finally deregistered (para 19). Hectocorp, in
turn, appealed to the first respondent, the Minister, who overturned the
Acting Director-General’s acceptance of Palala’s application for renewal of
its prospecting right (para 20). The Minister was of the view that the Acting
Director-General had been influenced by the misplaced contention that
Palala’s deregistration process had not been finalised. The Minister was
further of the view that Palala’s restoration in terms of s 73(6A) of the
Companies Act did not change the lapsing of the prospecting right by virtue
of the provisions of s 56(c) of the MPRDA (ibid).
Palala subsequently applied to the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
for a review of the Minister’s decision that its prospecting right had lapsed
(ibid; as to the grounds for review, see para 28). Palala contended that the
effect of the deeming provision in s 73(6A) of the Companies Act was,
retrospectively, to revive a prospecting right that had lapsed by operation of
s 56(c) of the MPRDA (para 50). Hectocorp contended that, in terms of
s 56(c), upon deregistration of a company the prospecting right lapsed and
became void by operation of law (para 70). Despite the state being the
custodian of the nation’s mineral resources in terms of s 3(1) of the MPRDA,
and being responsible for the granting and renewal of rights, the Minister and
the Regional Manager did not play a role in the court proceedings (para 2).
THE LEGAL ISSUE
At issue before the court was ‘whether the deeming provision contained in
s 73(6A) of the Companies Act, which applies on the subsequent restoration
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of a company’s registration, has the legal effect of reviving a prospecting right
that lapsed, by virtue of s 56(c) of the MPRDA, on deregistration of the
company’ (paras 7 and 21). Stated differently, was the Minister’s decision
influenced by a material error of law in the sense that she based her decision
on an incorrect interpretation and application of the abovementioned
statutory provisions (para 32)?
DECISION
In rejecting the applicant’s contention about the revival of its prospecting
right, Keightley AJ decided that:
• the deregistration of a company results in the loss of its legal personality
and its capacity to be the bearer of rights and duties (para 47);
• the company, being in limbo upon deregistration, can no longer exercise
the rights it enjoyed before deregistration or be bound by obligations to
which it was subject (para 64);
• upon deregistration a company loses ownership of its assets and no longer
holds any rights (para 47);
• the former assets and rights of a deregistered company that still exist are
treated as bona vacantia and vest in the state (paras 47 and 55);
• the general effect of the deeming provision in s 73(6A) of the Companies
Act is that the ‘legal personality of a company that is lost by its
deregistration is revived retrospectively’ (paras 41, 48, 49 and 70);
• the deeming provision only revives rights and assets that still exist and not
rights that have lost their legal validity and have become void (para 49);
• the general meaning and effect of s 73(6A) must be counter-balanced
with the intended meaning and effect of s 56(c) of the MPRDA (para 42);
• the intended meaning and effect of s 56(c) is that prospecting rights and
mining rights will ‘lapse, ie, become void or legally invalid’ by operation
of law upon deregistration (paras 45 and 70);
• the lapsing of rights does not take place if, prior to the deregistration, the
company applies for the Director-General’s written consent in terms of
s 11(1) to alienate or transfer the right to a third party who is in a position
to exploit it (paras 45 and 65);
• provisions about the lapsing of rights, such as s 56(c), are aligned with the
overall purpose and objectives of the MPRDA (paras 64–5); and
• the deeming provision in s 73(6A) of the Companies Act does not revive
the lapsed prospecting rights by operation of law once a company’s
registration is restored (paras 46 and 49).
The court thus held that in terms of a combined reading of s 73(6A) of the
Companies Act and s 56(c) of the MPRDA, the effect is that ‘while section
73(6A) retrospectively restores to a company those rights and assets that still
have legal existence, it does not have the effect of restoring a (prospecting)
right that has lapsed and no longer exists by operation of section 56(c)’ of the
MPRDA (para 55).
NOTES 41
It is submitted that the above principles can also be applied to other
instances of lapsing in terms of s 56(1) of the MPRDA of prospecting or
mining rights due to loss or restrictions of legal personality.
REASONING
The court indicated that the introduction of s 73(6A) into the Companies
Act took place after the MPRDA was enacted. The court showed that
interpretive presumptions, such as generalia specialibus non derogant (subse-
quent general legislation does not revoke prior specific legislation), and the
presumption against unnecessary alterations to existing law (see further paras
53–4), worked against the applicant’s contention that s 73(6A) implicitly
altered section 56(c) (para 55). The court reasoned further that the presump-
tion lex posterior priori derogat (a latter statute abrogates a prior one) does
not apply given the absence of irreconcilable conflict between s 73(6A) of the
Companies Act and s 56(c) of the MPRDA (para 55).
According to the court the express purpose of the MPRDA (listed in s 2) is
to ensure the promotion of economic growth, mining resources develop-
ment, employment and the social and economic welfare of all South Africans
(para 53). The court indicated that the purpose and regulatory scheme of the
MPRDA reinforced its decision (paras 57–62). The regulatory framework of
the MPRDA and s 56(c) was perceived as being consistent with the need for
factual and legal certainty in the administration and management of mining
and prospecting rights (paras 62 and 64). It was pointed out that dormant
prospecting and mining rights do not contribute to the objectives of the
MPRDA (para 63). The court also relied on s 4(1) of the MPRDA, which
prescribes a reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision that is consis-
tent with the objects of the MPRDA (para 69).
In its reasoning that the applicant’s contention about revival of rights is
inconsistent with the objects of the MPRDA, the court also focused on the
nature and features of prospecting and mining rights, which can be listed as
follows:
• prospecting and mining rights are recognised as limited real rights (para
63);
• the creation, nature and ambit of these rights are determined and
regulated by the provisions of the MPRDA rather than the common law
(paras 63 and 70);
• statutory duties about commencement and continuation of prospecting
or mining activities are imposed on holders of rights to put these rights
into practical effect (para 53);
• a prospecting or mining company facing deregistration is entitled to
apply for the Director-General’s consent to transfer the right to a third
party that can exploit it (para 65);
• prospecting and mining rights are terminated upon deregistration of the
prospector or miner holding such rights (para 70);
• prospecting and mining rights do not fall within the ordinary ‘basket’ of
rights that become bona vacantia on deregistration of the company (ibid);
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• lapsed prospecting or mining rights do not retrospectively revert to the
company on restoration of its registration under s 37(6A) of the Compa-
nies Act (ibid);
• upon the lapsing of a prospecting or mining right, such a right ‘reverts to
the custodianship of the State, which assumes the power to reallocate the
right in terms of the MPRDA’, and thus ‘[ensures] that the objectives of
the MPRDA are met’ (para 65).
The court concluded that its decision is consistent with the clear terms of
s 56(c), the rules of interpretation of statutes and the purpose and objectives of
the MPRDA (para 71).
FINDING
The court found that the Minister was correct in her application of s 56(c) of
the MPRDA and that s 73(6A) of the Companies Act does not change the
position (para 74). The effect of this finding was that Palala’s application for
the renewal of its prospecting right was correctly rejected by the Department
on the basis that its prospecting right had lapsed on the deregistration of Palala
on 16 July 2010. The court found, accordingly, that there was no merit in
Palala’s case (ibid) and dismissed its application (supra 79).
COMMENTARY
Keightley AJ’s decision is sound and well-reasoned. This was despite the
shortcomings of the grounds for review raised by the applicant, and the lack
of awareness on the part of the litigants that the review is governed by the
Promotion of the Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (paras 23–33; see also
s 6(1) of the MPRDA).
The labelling in s 5(1) of the MPRDA by the legislature of a prospecting
or mining right as a limited real right was to provide security of tenure to
prospecting or mining companies and allay fears of insecure rights by
investors in such companies (see further Badenhorst 2014 Journal of Energy &
Natural Resources Law op cit at 17). Such a label (including the notion of a
mineral right of the previous mineral law dispensation being a quasi-
servitude or right sui generis right) is in line with the legal development of a
mineral right, as a limited real right, since the Middle Ages (Badenhorst &
Mostert op cit at 1-4 to 1-6), South African mining law since substantial
discoveries of mineral resources (P J Badenhorst ‘Klassifikasie en kenmerke
van mineraalregte’ 1994 THRHR 34) and developments in other civil-law
mining jurisdictions, such as Louisiana (P J Badenhorst ‘A few fundamental
aspects of Louisiana mineral law’ 1993 TSAR 732; ‘Mineral rights under
Louisiana law’ (1994) 27 De Jure 54). In the English common law, England
and Australia also recognise the equivalent of a servitude for exploitation of
mineral resources, namely, a profit à prendre granted by the holder of an
estate over privately-held minerals (P J Badenhorst ‘Towards a theory on
publicly-owned minerals in Victoria’ (2014) 22 Australian Property LJ 157 at
160 and 162, respectively; Michael W Hunt Mining Law in Western Australia
NOTES 43
4 ed (2009) 38). It is too late in the day, conceptually alien, and contrary to
similar legal developments in other jurisdictions to attempt ex post facto to
treat mineral rights that existed in the past as ‘ownership of minerals’ (as
Mogoeng CJ did in Agri SA v Minister of Minerals and Energy (2013 (4) SA 1
(CC) para 39)). The creation of prospecting and mining rights that are
limited real rights by registration in a public office is in line with South
African property law and other mining jurisdictions (see, however, Hanri
Mostert ‘The ‘thing’ called ‘mineral right’: Re-examining the nature,
content and scope of a rather confounding concept in South African law’
(2014) 17 Nomos Recht in Africa 28).
It is not clear from the Palala Resources decision whether the prospecting
right of Palala was registered in the MPTRO, as required by s 19(2)(a) of the
MPRDA. If it was registered, it was indeed a limited real right (s 5(1)). If it
was merely granted by the Regional Manager and not registered, it was not
yet a limited real right. In Meepo v Kotze 2008 (1) SA 104 (NC) para 46.3 it
was held that the act in terms of which a ‘prospecting right’ is granted to an
applicant is contractual in nature. It entails that the Minister (or delegate)
consensually agrees to grant to an applicant a limited real right to prospect for
a mineral or minerals on specified land for a specified period, subject to such
terms and conditions as may be determined or agreed upon. Accordingly, a
prospecting right can only be granted once the terms and conditions have
been determined, communicated to an applicant for acceptance, and
consensually agreed upon or consented to by an applicant (ibid para 46.3). It
is conceded that whether it was indeed a personal or real right does not
change the fact that, upon deregistration of the company, s 56(c) of the
MPRDA rang the death knell for the ‘prospecting right’. Whatever right
existed cannot be re-vested in the company on restoration of its registration,
and the nature of the right would not have changed the reasoning and
outcome of the decision. If the prospecting right was indeed registered, the
practical problem, however, remains that the Director-General would still
require a court order to cancel a registered prospecting right (s 7 of the
Mining Titles Registration Act) in order to make eventual registration of
Hectocorp’s prospecting right possible. If this is the case the remaining
practical problem can be attributed to the non-participation of the Depart-
ment in the litigation. The termination of the prospecting right also meant
that the linkage with other rights, such as the right of renewal of a
prospecting right or to apply for a mining right, is also broken. As the facts of
this decision illustrate, the deregistration of a company holding a prospecting
right can have far-reaching consequences. Legal certainty and compliance
with statutory provisions are ensured by the decision of the court.
We have seen that Keightley AJ was of the view that the acquisition,
nature and content of prospecting and mining rights have to be determined
with reference to the MPRDA and not the common law. This is correct in
so far as prospecting and mining rights are creatures of statute. The
legislature, however, has used a common-law concept, namely, a ‘limited
real right’ in its creation of these statutory creatures. In other words, to give
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form and content to its creation the legislature used a common-law concept
which, in turn, enhances security of tenure. Section 4(2) of the MPRDA
determines that if the common law is inconsistent with the MPRDA, the Act
prevails. It is submitted that the notion of a limited real right is not
inconsistent with the rights granted in terms of the MPRDA and registered
in terms of the Mining Titles Registration Act. It is further submitted that its
common-law meaning can be used to shed light on these creatures of statute.
The common-law distinction between a ius in re sua (ownership) and ius in
re aliena (limited real rights) is well known (see C G van der Merwe Sakereg 2
ed (1989) 69; P J Badenhorst, Juanita M Pienaar & Hanri Mostert Silberberg
and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 47). A limited real right
implies ownership from which the limited real right has been subtracted. It
can either be the ownership of the land (including the minerals) (if the cuius
est solum rule still applies in South African mineral law) or the ownership of
unsevered minerals (if s 3(1) of the MPRDA has abolished the cuius est
solum rule and created new res). In terms of the MPRDA, ownership of land
does not include entitlement to mineral exploitation, and, upon a grant of a
prospecting or mining right by the state, an owner of land is deprived (and
expropriated) of his entitlements of use and enjoyment of the land (M O
Dale, L Bekker, F J Bashall et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law
(2005) (Service Issue 10) MPRDA-131). The owner of land cannot grant
any rights of mineral exploitation to a prospector or miner. It is submitted
that the relevant ownership is ownership of the unsevered minerals in the
land in terms of s 3(1) of the MPRDA. The holder of such ownership in
terms of s 3(1) is less clear.
The vesting of rights per se in the state is not readily admitted by the
legislature in the MPRDA. Section 3(1) determines that the state ‘is the
custodian’ of the mineral resources. The notion of a custodian is vague. A
custodian is described as a person who controls a thing on behalf of another
(Dale, Bekker & Bashall et al op cit at MPRDA-125). The problem remains
that the nation as ‘another’ person is not a person in law (ibid at MPRDA-
123). This would mean that the express trust or custodianship in s 3(1) of the
MPRDA has failed due to the lack of a beneficiary. In English law a failed
express trust culminates in the creation of a resulting trust in terms of which
the beneficiary holds property as trustee for the settlor of the failed express
trust (see Samantha Hepburn Australian Property Law Cases, Materials and
Analysis 3 ed (2014) 469). Even if this implied trust existed in South African
law, which is not the case, the nation (as the new trustee holding it for the
state) is still not a person in law. In short, the vague construction employed in
s 3(1) cannot even be rescued by recourse to a system of equity. It is also not
clear what weight is to be attached to the feature of control. The feature of
control over access to something (ie excludability) is primarily regarded by
Kevin Gray (‘Property in thin air’ (1991) 50 Cambridge LJ 252 at 299) as the
essence of the notion of ‘property’. Gray does not construe property as a
‘thing’ but rather a power relationship (ibid). Applying this argument to the
custodian construction of the MPRDA, the state as custodian has control
NOTES 45
over access to (or excludability of) mineral resources and, accordingly, has
‘property’ of it. The existence of a power relationship between the state and
mineral resources cannot be denied. It can be contrasted with owners of land
who have no control over access to (or excludability of) mineral resources on
their own land, and thus have no property in such resources. A power
relationship between the owner of land and mineral resources does not exist.
Similarly, in terms of the doctrine of rights, mineral rights in the previous
dispensation had as its content the entitlement of disposition, which meant
that the holder of a mineral right was entitled to determine what may and
what may not be done on the land for purposes of the exploitation of
minerals (see Badenhorst & Mostert op cit at 3-12; Agri SA v Minister of
Minerals and Energy (GNP) (supra) para 29). Such determination amounted to
excludability in Gray’s terminology. The same holds true for the content of
rights to minerals in terms of the MPRDA which inter alia also includes the
entitlement of disposition (see P J Badenhorst ‘Towards an old school theory
on (new) rights to minerals’ in Marita Carnelley, Shannon Hoctor & Andre
Mukheiber De Jure Gentium et Civili. Festschrift in Honour of Eltjo Schrage
(2014) 119 at 127). Based on the view of Gray, one can argue that ownership
of unsevered minerals or rights to minerals (ie ‘property’) is vested in the
state. A private-law analysis, therefore, does provide an explanation for the
vesting of rights in the state.
Dale, Bekker & Bashall et al, however, maintain that the right to prospect
or mine is not vested in the state (op cit at MPRDA-11). The court decided
that upon lapsing of a prospecting right, such right ‘reverts to the custodian-
ship of the state, which assumes the power to reallocate the right in terms of
the MPRDA’ (para 65). Reversion seems to imply that ‘something’ is
acquired by the state which it had before. If the view of Dale et al is correct,
the right to prospect cannot be re-vested in the state. According to this view,
only control of a ‘thing’ is regained by the custodian. In terms of Gray’s
approach, the access to control (property) of mineral resources (excludabil-
ity) is regained by the state. The principle seems to be that upon termination
of a prospecting right, the right (or rather its content) reverts to the state
which, in turn, is empowered to grant new rights. It should be remembered
that Wallis JA stated, in Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri SA 2012 (5) SA 1
(SCA) para 86, that s 3(1) ‘encapsulates in non-technical language the notion
that the right to mine vests in the State’. If such right (in the sense of a right to
minerals) is indeed vested in the state, the right to prospect reverts, upon
lapsing, to the state.
The courts are also not keen to clarify the notion of a custodian (see Agri
SA v Minister of Minerals and Energy (CC) (supra) para 71), or to identify the
holder of rights to minerals. The vesting of lapsed old-order rights in the
state was denied by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional
Court in the Agri SA line of decisions. It should be remembered that
old-order rights were also creatures of statutes created by the MPRDA (see,
in general, P J Badenhorst ‘The make-up of transitional rights to minerals:
Something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue . . .?
(2016) 133 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL46
(2011) 128 SALJ 763). For instance, in Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri
SA (SCA) the majority of the court decided that, upon termination of an
unused old-order right due to failure (or rather inability) of its holder to apply
for new prospecting or mining rights in terms of the MPRDA, nothing was
lost by the former holder and nothing was acquired by the state. Expropria-
tion, therefore, did not take place. It was reasoned that the state was always
the holder of the right to mine (for criticism of this decision, see further,
Johan D van der Vyver, ‘Nationalisation of mineral rights in South Africa’
2012 De Jure 125; P J Badenhorst, ‘Expropriation of ‘‘unused old order
rights’’ by the MPRDA: You had nothing!’ (2013) 76 THRHR 472;
‘Large-scale expropriation of mineral rights in South Africa: The Agri South
Africa fiasco’ (2012) 31 Australian Resources and Energy LJ 205). The majority
of the Constitutional Court in Agri SA v Minister of Minerals and Energy (CC)
also decided that an expropriation of unused old-order rights did not take
place by enactment of the MPRDA. The majority of the court reasoned that,
despite deprivation of entitlements of unused old-order rights, no acquisition
thereof by the state took place (for criticism of this decision, see further,
P J Badenhorst ‘Onteiening van onbenutte ou-orde regte: Het iets niets
geword? Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy (2013 (4) SA 1
(CC)’ (2014) 77 THRHR 313; Pieter Badenhorst & Nic Olivier ‘The Agri
South Africa Constitutional Court decision’ (2014) 33 Australian Resources and
Energy LJ 230; Elmarie van der Schyff & Nic Olivier ‘’n Perspektief op die
impak van die Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 28 van 2002
op voorheen bestaaande regte’ LitNet (2014) 11 at 52). In other words,
according to the two Agri SA decisions, upon termination of unused
old-order rights by the provisions of the MPRDA, nothing reverts to the
state. This seems odd. Just like the lapsing of a prospecting right in terms of
s 56(c) of the MPRDA, an unused old-order right, in the words of the
legislature, is said to cease to exist upon expiry of the one-year interim period
(in the absence of an application) (item 8 of the Transitional Arrangements in
terms of Schedule II of the MPRDA). Despite suffering the same legal fate,
that is, the lapsing and cessation of legal existence, the legal consequences,
however, differ upon the lapsing of a prospecting right and cessation of an
unused old-order right. In other words, in the absence of expropriation,
unused old-order rights evaporate legally, whilst a new (untainted) prospect-
ing right somehow reverts to the control of the state. Or, to rephrase Orwell,
does the termination of some creatures of statute have lesser consequences
than others?
In a separate judgment in Minister of Mineral Resources v Sishen Iron Ore
Company (Pty) Ltd & another 2014 (2) SA 603 (CC), Moseneke DCJ decided
that upon the failure by one of two joint holders of old-order mining rights
to convert old-order mining rights into new mining rights, the mining right
ceased to exist in relation to the holder, but did not cease to exist in relation
to the state ((supra) para 108). It was held that upon expiry of the interim
period the mineral and land ‘revert to the State because it is the custodian of
all mineral and petroleum resources’ (ibid). What was exactly meant by the
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words mineral and land is not clear. Allodial ownership of land is, at present,
still recognised in South Africa and vested in the owners thereof (see,
however, the propagation of a system of (English style) land tenure by the
government in 6.4 of the Green Paper on Land Reform, 2011 (GN 639
GG 34607 of 16 September 2011; see also the new proposed Land Holdings
Bill of 2015). The words ‘land’ and ‘mineral’ could either have referred to
unsevered minerals in the land or some right to such minerals. Jafta J, who
delivered the main judgment was, however, of the view that ‘(o)wnership of
all mineral and petroleum resources is now vested in the nation’ ((supra) paras
16 and 44), which is incorrect as vesting in the nation, which lacks legal
personality, is not possible. The view of Moseneke DCJ that ‘minerals’
reverted to the state is preferred as correct (see P J Badenhorst, ‘Expropriation
of ‘old order’ mineral rights in South Africa: The Constitutional Court has its
say (twice)’ (2014) 4 Property LR 53 at 58). In other words, upon termination
of an old-order mining right by failure not to apply for conversion, the right
reverts to the state. Just like the lapsing of a prospecting right in terms of s 56
of the MPRDA, an old-order mining right is said to cease to exist upon
failure timeously to lodge the right for conversion (item 7(8) of the
Transitional Arrangements in terms of Schedule II of the MPRDA). In this
instance, the consequences are the same, that is, the vesting of ‘something’ in
the state upon termination of a prior right.
The Palala Resources case under discussion is in line with the approach of
Moseneke DCJ in the Sishen decision, namely that upon termination of a
statutory right it reverts to the control of the state. The same principle should
have been applied to the Agri SA decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal
and the Constitutional Court, namely that upon termination of an unused
old-order right such right reverted to the control of the state (Badenhorst
(2014) Property LR op cit at 58). The expropriation by enactment of the
MPRDA would then have been recognised.
A private-law analysis also provides an explanation for the re-vesting of
rights. If the right to prospect or mine is indeed vested in the state, such right
has as its content inter alia a reversionary entitlement (see Badenhorst in
Carnelley, Hoctor & Mukheiber (eds) op cit at 127). The existence of this
entitlement explains the legal phenomenon of re-vesting of rights. Thus, by
virtue of the state’s reversionary entitlement in terms of its right, the
entitlement to prospect or mine reverts to the state upon lapsing, termination
or cessation of a prospecting right or mining right (ibid).
The view has been expressed that it serves no purpose to examine current
mineral law in the context of private-law concepts such as ownership (per
Wallis JA in Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri SA (SCA) (supra) para 86;
see also, Dale, Bekker, Bashall et al op cit at MPRDA-115). According to
Mostert (op cit at 51), during the previous mineral-law dispensation, the
concept of a mineral right was theorised largely in ‘terms of private property
law, with very little academic regard for the regulatory context in which the
rights were allowed to be exercised’. Mostert maintains that this erroneous
approach ignored the statutory control over mineral resources (Mostert op
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cit at 46; see, however, the recognition of statutory restrictions by Blen
Lloyd, Stuart Franklin & Morris Kaplan in the beginning of their seminal
work The Mining and Minerals Laws of South Africa (1984) 2–4) and
sovereignty over natural resources (Mostert op cit at 47–8). An examination
of mineral rights in the public-law dimension is preferred. If it is accepted
that the same holds true for ordinary ownership of land, namely, that it is
subject to statutory restrictions (see, for instance, Van der Merwe op cit at
177–83) and principles of international law, one may ask why private
disputes about land ownership should not also have been considered in the
public law dimension and international plane? Stated differently, the fact that
for instance an act of expropriation in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of
1975 of ownership of land, or a limited real right in respect of land, amounts
to an administrative act within the realm of administrative law, did not in the
past and present constitutional dispensation exclude a private-law analysis of
the object of expropriation (see P J Badenhorst ‘Die vereistes vir ’n geldige
onteieningskennisgewing — Provinsiale Administrasie Kaap die Goeie Hoop v
Swart’ (1989) 52 THRHR 130; Antonie Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 2 ed
(2001) 8–9 and 61–3). Being an administrative act also did not prevent
treatment of expropriation as a mode of termination of rights in property law
(see Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert op cit at 250). The decision in the Palala
Resources case, with notions such as limited real rights, ways of termination of
limited real rights and legal personality, however, illustrates that the reliance
on private-law concepts remains necessary to resolve mineral-law disputes.
The fact that a company, as a legal person, is itself a creature of statute does
not disqualify private-law analysis of this creature. Public law may not have
been able to provide a principled conceptual framework to explain the
decision. Or, would the following statement have sufficed: ‘What is granted
by a Sovereign (holding no rights) can be taken by a Sovereign (holding no
rights)’? The sudden unpopularity of private law in present day mineral-law
analysis perhaps stems from the fact that its recognition of former privately-
held rights of the old order, and exposure of the unrecognised loss of such
rights without compensation, stand in the way of the large-scale free
enlargement of the fiscus for eventual redistribution. The MPRDA and the
property clause do provide for transformative enlargement of the fiscus with
mineral resources, but against payment of compensation (item 12 of the
Transitional Arrangements and s 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution; Van der
Vyver op cit at 139). A private-law analysis of rights provided a theoretical
basis for a just outcome of the transformation process, namely the expropria-
tion of former rights against payment of compensation. (See, for instance, the
decision of the court a quo in Agri SA v Minister of Minerals and Energy (GNP);
P J Badenhorst ‘Large-scale expropriation of mineral rights in South Africa:
The Agri South Africa saga’ (2011) 30 Australian Resources and Energy LJ 261;
P J Badenhorst & N J J Olivier ‘Expropriation of ‘‘unused old order rights’’
by the MPRDA: You have lost it!’ (2012) 75 THRHR 329.) Private-law
analysis will be needed in future to expose possible unconstitutional enlarge-
ments of the fiscus by government.
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VIII CONCLUSION
The vesting and re-vesting of rights to minerals in terms of the MPRDA in
the state can be explained by private law-analysis. It was decided in the Palala
Resources decision that upon the deregistration of a company holding a
prospecting right in terms of the MPRDA, such prospecting right lapsed and
was re-vested in the state as custodian. Vesting in the state as the holder of
rights ought to have been recognised. Such a principle about the re-vesting
of a right upon termination of a prospecting right by the MPRDA is also
supported by the approach of Moseneke DCJ in the Sishen decision of the
Constitutional Court and private-law theory. The Palala Resources decision
illustrates the continued need and importance of private-law analysis. This
may be even more true in future attempts to increase the fiscus for
redistribution. Re-vesting of a right or ‘something’ by the MPRDA in the
state implies that the right or ‘something’ must have been vested in the state
in the first place. It will become more difficult in the future for the courts, in
cases dealing with the termination of statutory rights, not to acknowledge
that vesting in the state, as custodian or otherwise, did not take place at the
outset.
It was further decided in Palala Resources that, upon restoration of the
registration of a company, s 73(6A) of the Companies Act retrospectively
restores the rights and assets to the company that still have legal existence, but
it does not restore rights that have lapsed by operation of s 56(c) of the
MPRDA. These principles can also be applied to other instances of lapsed
prospecting or mining rights due to the loss or restrictions of legal personality
by s 56(1) of the MPRDA.
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